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ABSTRACT
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have grown exponentially over the past decade. The ini-
tial use of social media for benign purposes (e.g., to socialize with friends, browse pictures
and photographs, and communicate with family members overseas) has now transitioned
to include malicious activities (e.g., cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare). These
nefarious uses of OSNs poses a signiﬁcant threat to society, and thus requires research at-
tention. In this exploratory work, we study activities of one deviant groups: hacker groups
on social media, which we term Deviant Hacker Networks (DHN). We investigated the con-
nection between diﬀerent DHNs on Twitter: how they are connected, identiﬁed the powerful
nodes, which nodes sourced information, and which nodes act as bridges between diﬀerent
network components. From this, we were able to identify and articulate speciﬁc examples
of DHNs communicating with each other, with the goal of committing some form of deviant
act online. In our work, we also attempted to bridge the gap between the empirical study
of OSNs and cyber forensics, as the growth of OSNs is now bringing these two domains
together, due to OSNs continuously generating vast amounts of evidentiary data.
Keywords: deviant hacking groups, focal structure analysis, FSA, groups coordination,
collective action, deviant groups.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a relatively short period of time, On-
line Social Networks (OSNs) have revolu-
tionized how societies interact with the In-
ternet, especially with regards to commu-
nication. While this new phenomenon in
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online socialization has brought the world
closer together, OSNs have also led to new
vectors to facilitate cybercrime, cyberterror-
ism, and other deviant behaviors.
Online deviant groups have grown in par-
allel with OSNs. Groups with malicious
actors, such as Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) typically disseminate their
message of terror and recruit people using
OSNs. Black hat hackers with the intent
of coordinating cyber attacks may also be
considered another group with malicious in-
tent. The threat these deviant groups pose
is real and can manifest in several forms
of deviance, such as the disabling of criti-
cal infrastructure (e.g., the Ukraine power
outage caused by Russian-sponsored hack-
ers that coordinated a cyber attack in De-
cember 2015 1, and ISIL recruiters who in-
ﬂuence impressionable youth on Internet fo-
rums and social media outlets to join extrem-
ist groups and participate in heinous acts of
terror (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, 2015a). Ob-
servable malicious behaviors in OSNs, simi-
lar to the aforementioned ones, continue to
negatively impact society. This necessitates
their scientiﬁc inquiry.
It would be of beneﬁt to the Informa-
tion Assurance (IA) domain, and its re-
spective sub-domains, to conduct novel re-
search on the phenomenon of deviant be-
havior in OSNs. One evident form of de-
viant behavior comes in the form of commu-
nications between black hat hacking groups
on OSNs, which we term Deviant Hacker
Networks (DHN). In this preliminary work
we attempted to answer the following re-
search questions: 1) Do DHNs employ so-
cial media platforms to coordinate attacks?
If so, what are their levels of sophistica-
tion?; 2) Can their aﬃliations be tracked
1U.S. helping Ukraine investigate power grid
hack. Reuters. Jan. 12 2016. Available at:
http://reut.rs/1PqNAYG.
and monitored?; 3) Can their coordination
strategies and communication networks be
inferred from empirical observation, data set
collection, and analysis? and; 4) Can the
most inﬂuential set of nodes be identiﬁed?
It is apparent that these questions require
inquiry since at the time of writing this pa-
per, research on this topic was sparse. Our
work resulted in the following contributions:
• We proposed a framework that can pro-
vide insights about DHNs from OSNs
(e.g., the communications of nodes be-
tween and within their respective focal
structures.
• We observed and analyzed the commu-
nication network of DHNs that use so-
cial media as a means to communicate
and coordinate their attacks.
• We were able to identify key accounts
(e.g., powerful sources of information
through the measure of their out-degree
centrality) and powerful coordinating
DHNs using the Focal Structure Analy-
sis (FSA) algorithm.
The rest of the article is organized as fol-
lows. Theoretical background of the research
is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the research methodology, including a de-
scription of the data set and software used
to collect the data, then results and analysis,
and ﬁnally our proposed framework. Section
4 concludes the study with possible future
research directions.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Forensic Analysis of Social
Applications
Most scientiﬁc work to date has focused on
the acquisition of social data from digital
devices as well as applications installed on
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them. Over time, OSNs have become the
largest and fastest growing entities on the
Internet, containing hundreds of millions of
people, and now bots. OSNs, hosted on plat-
forms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter,
contain a plethora of data about its mem-
bers, which is of interest to both digital
forensic scientists and practitioners Huber et
al. (2011). The forensic potential of these
OSNs has been acknowledged by research,
and there have been a number of studies
on extracting this forensically relevant data
from them.
In the seminal work by Al Mutawa, Bag-
gili, and Marrington (2012), researchers con-
ducted the primary forensic analysis of three
popular social networking smartphone appli-
cations: Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace.
Their results indicated that while no traces
of forensically valuable artifacts were retriev-
able from Blackberry devices, iPhones and
Android phones stored a signiﬁcant amount
of valuable data on user activities that may
be recovered by forensic investigators. This
data included usernames, passwords, chat
messages, posts, location data, and pictures,
just to name a few (Al Mutawa et al., 2012).
Other work also focused on the retrieval of
artifacts from the network captures of social-
messaging applications as opposed to data
from the storage on these devices. Walnycky,
Baggili, Marrington, Moore, and Breitinger
(2015) forensically acquired and analyzed lo-
cally stored data and network traﬃc of 20
popular Android social-messaging applica-
tions. They were able to reconstruct partial
or entire message contents from 16 of the 20
applications in their study. While this re-
ﬂected poorly on the security of the appli-
cations, it could be seen positively with re-
gards to evidence collection from a forensics
standpoint. Their reconstruction and inter-
ception of passwords, pictures, videos, audio,
and other forms of digital artifacts signiﬁes
the great potential for extracting evidence
from the very OSNs that result from the use
of these applications.
These examples of traditional digital
forensic research initiatives are of relevance
to our work, as evidence to the activities,
communications, and motives of DHNs may
be recovered from artifacts left behind by
users of social networking applications - ei-
ther from the device, or from the network
traﬃc generated by the applications.
Nonetheless, this data would be based on
the analysis of the more traditional sources
of evidence found on systems and devices,
such as ﬁle systems and captured network
traﬃc. OSNs are continuously creating and
storing data on multiple servers across the
Internet through their respective social net-
works. These newer forms of data, espe-
cially the communications of hacker groups
on OSNs, would likely pertain to, for exam-
ple, coordination and planning. This would
mean that traditional methods of forensic in-
vestigation would be insuﬃcient, as this data
would be real-time, constantly expanding,
and simply not found in traditional sources
of forensic evidence.
2.2 Forensic Retrieval of
OSN-generated
Evidentiary Data
As discussed, a growing challenge for foren-
sic investigations is the emergence of OSNs
and their multitude of online communication
vectors, producing data with heightened vol-
ume, variety and velocity - big data at its
essence. This data cannot be accessed using
traditional digital forensic techniques related
to storage and memory media analysis.
Baggili and Breitinger (2015) highlighted
that social media is growing as a data source
for cyber forensics, providing new types of
artifacts that can be relevant to investiga-
tions. They identiﬁed key social media data
sources (e.g., text posts, friends/groups, im-
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ages, geolocation data, demographic infor-
mation, videos, dates/times), as well as their
corresponding applications to cyber forensics
(author attribution, social network identiﬁ-
cation, facial/object recognition, personal-
ity proﬁling, location ﬁnding, cyber proﬁl-
ing, deception detection, event reconstruc-
tion, etc.).
Baggili and Breitinger (2015) further em-
phasized that in the future, practitioners
should embrace the idea of using real-time
intelligence to assist in investigations, and
not just post-mortem data.
Key work in this realm was executed by
Mulazzani, Huber, andWeippl (2012), where
they addressed the challenge of traditional
computer forensics in the growing number
of cases that involve evidence being gener-
ated through cloud services and their use of
distributed data centers (Mulazzani et al.,
2012). In their work, they identiﬁed key
data sources and analytical methods for au-
tomated forensic analysis on social network
user data. This work is relevant to our re-
search, as the hundreds of millions of OSN
users online makes the forensic data extrac-
tion from them a requirement. Furthermore,
Mulazzani et al. (2012) were able to present
a method to evaluate these data sources in
an automated fashion and generate visual
graphs of interest. To note, their work was
conducted without the need to collaborate
with the social network operator (in their
case, Facebook).
Based on prior work in this domain, it
is clear that OSNs contain vast amounts
of important, and often publicly accessible
data that can service cyber forensics and re-
lated disciplines. A progression must thus be
made towards developing and/or adopting
methodologies to eﬀectively collect and ana-
lyze evidentiary data extracted from OSNs,
and leverage them in relevant domains out-
side of classical information sciences.
2.3 Intelligence-driven
Analyses of OSNs
As OSNs continuously replace traditional
means of digital storage, sharing, and com-
munication (Huber et al., 2011), collecting
this ever-growing volume of data is becoming
a challenge. Within the past decade, data
collected from OSNs has already played a
major role as evidence in criminal cases, ei-
ther as incriminating evidence or to conﬁrm
alibis 2 3 4.
Online deviant groups, like terrorist
groups, criminal organizations, and in our
speciﬁc research interest, DHNs, continue to
utilize OSNs to promote, enhance, and fa-
cilitate their respective goals. It might be
more eﬃcient to take an intelligence-driven
approach for identifying evidentiary trails.
Harvesting forensically relevant data directly
from targeted OSN user accounts, as we aim
to do in our work, would be more eﬃcient
than traditional forensic techniques of ana-
lyzing the hardware, network traﬃc, ﬁle sys-
tems, and other traditional scenarios in dig-
ital forensics.
Interestingly, despite the growing impor-
tance of data that can be extracted from
OSNs, there has been little academic re-
search aimed at developing and enhancing
techniques to eﬀectively collect and ana-
lyze this data Huber et al. (2011). Our
work aims to take steps towards bridging the
gap between cyber forensics and social net-
work analysis through a primary exploratory
study that focuses on DHNs. Despite the
lack of research in this domain, there have
been seminal research eﬀorts similar to our
proposed work.
2Facebook status update provides alibi. CNN.
2009.
3Criminal Found via Facebook. The New York
Criminal Law Blog. 2009.
4Facebook: a place to meet, gossip, share photos
of stolen goods. The Washington Post. 2010.
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A similar research thrust was conducted
by Huber et al. (2011), where they utilized
an automated web browser combined with
an OSN third party application (in this case,
Facebook) to gather social snapshots of data
sets of user data and relational information
of the targeted social network.
In our work, we used an algorithm devel-
oped by en, Wigand, Agarwal, Tokdemir,
and Kasprzyk (2016) to discover inﬂuential
sets of individuals in online social networks
called Focal Structure Analysis (FSA) (en,
Wigand, Agarwal, Mete, & Kasprzyk, 2014).
This algorithm has been tested on many
real world cases such as the Saudi Arabian
women's Oct26Driving campaign on Twitter
(Yuce, Agarwal, Wigand, Lim, & Robinson,
2014). Results showed that focal structures
are more interactive than average individu-
als and more interactive than communities
in the evolution of a mass protest, i.e., the
interaction rate of focal structures are signif-
icantly higher than the average interaction
rate of random sets of individuals, and the
number of retweets, mentions, and replies in-
crease proportionally with respect to the fol-
lowers of the individuals within communities
(en et al., 2016).
The 2014 Ukraine Crisis is another FSA
application example. When a British jour-
nalist and a blogger known as Graham W.
Phillips covered the 2014 Ukraine crisis and
became a growing star on Kremlin-owned
media (Seddon, 2014; en et al., 2016), FSA
was applied on a blog-blog network and re-
sults illustrated that Graham Phillips was
involved in the only focal structure of the
entire network along with ITAR-TASS (the
Russian News Agency) and Voice of Rus-
sia (the Russian government's international
radio broadcasting service). Graham W.
Phillips was actively involved in the crisis as
a blogger, and maintained a single-authored
blog with signiﬁcant inﬂuence when com-
pared to some of the active mainstream me-
dia blogs (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, Under re-
view).
FSA has also been used in the case of the
Dragoon Ride Exercise to discover the most
inﬂuential set of botnets or the seeders of
information used to disseminate the propa-
ganda (bots that by working together pro-
foundly impact propaganda dissemination)
(Al-khateeb & Agarwal, Under review).
3. EXPLORATORY
WORK
3.1 Data Collection
A seed data set was created by manually
searching for hacker accounts on Twitter.
The accounts chosen were selected based
on their self-identifying statuses as hackers
with deviant and malicious intentions. We
started with a list of 49 DHNs known for
their promotion of deviant activities and per-
sonas. To note, the researchers are aware
that some self-proclaimed hacker accounts
on Twitter are actually benevolent in nature,
i.e., white-hat hackers. These accounts
were avoided. We were able to identify
62 Twitter accounts for these DHNs (some
groups have more than one account, and
some groups we could not ﬁnd their Twitter
handles). We crawled their Twitter network
using NodeXl (Foundation, 2014) which uses
the Twitter API to collect data for the period
between 11/25/2008 7:03:30 PM UTC and
11/28/2015 9:20:06 PM UTC. This resulted
in a directed graph that contained 58,120
unique twitter nodes and 76,964 unique
edges. (Total edges with duplicates are
87,318). The edges were as follows:
• We obtained 2,837 Tweet edges: these
are the edges created when a user
tweets something. These are repre-
sented self-loops (from the user tweeting
to him/herself).
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• We obtained 6,148 Mentions edges:
these are the edges created when a
user mentions someone (i.e., include a
preceeding `@' character with another
Twitter handle) in the tweet or retweet
of another user.
• We obtained 1,405 Replies to edges:
these are a special form of the mention
edges that occur when the user's name
is at the very start of a tweet.
• We obtained 76,928 Friends and Fol-
lowers edges: these are the edges cre-
ated when a user follows or followed by
other users.
The network also contained 6 isolates (one
node alone not connected to any other
nodes) and 1 big connected component (ev-
eryone is connected to some other nodes).
The big component had 58, 114 unique nodes
and 87, 318 edges. The network we col-
lected also had a maximum geodesic distance
(Diameter) = 9 which meant the network is
quite large (it takes a maximum of 9 steps
to get from one side of the network to the
other) but also the network has an average
geodesic distance = 3.8 which portrays that
information is likely to reach all the nodes
in the network quite quickly (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005).
3.2 Results & Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results we ob-
tained from applying social network analysis
on the collected data, then discuss the re-
sults we obtained form applying FSA (en
et al., 2016).
3.2.1 Social Network Analysis of the
Data
As mentioned earlier, we collected the Twit-
ter network of the identiﬁed DHN accounts.
By examining their overall network we were
able to identify the most used hashtags (See
Table 1. The number of nodes in each of
the focal structures. The focal structure
FSA_ID1 has the highest number of nodes.
The FSA_ID is to distinguish the FSAs
only.
Focal structure Number of nodes
ID in the FSA
FSA_ID1 18
FSA_ID2 3
FSA_ID3 5
FSA_ID4 2
FSA_ID5 2
FSA_ID6 9
FSA_ID7 3
FSA_ID8 16
Table 2 Appendix A) in the network (these
are appropriate for discerning if a counter
message were to be pushed to the same au-
dience who follow these speciﬁc hashtags),
or keywords/ bigrams (See Table 3 Ap-
pendix A) (which are useful for exploring
what these groups are mainly talking about
without having to read entire tweets), the
most used URLs (to explore what messages
these groups are trying to deliver e.g., is it
a YouTube video? or a blog entry?, etc.),
and the domains they used frequently (can
be used as seed knowledge to be fed into
forensic investigations to discover other re-
lated websites e.g., websites managed by the
same Unique Identiﬁer can be retrieved us-
ing digital forensic techniques, ﬁnding geo-
locations, IP Addresses, owner details, etc.).
From the primary analysis, we identi-
ﬁed three key ﬁndings: 1) with regards
to the bigram tango,down, which has the
largest entire graph count (173). The hacker
group, Anonymous, often included the hash-
tag Tango Down to signify a successful
DDoS attack5; 2) the hashtag #OpNimr",
5Anonymous: CIA, Interpol websites 'tango
down'. Reuters. 2012.
Page 12 c© 2016 ADFSL
Exploring Deviant Hacker Networks ... JDFSL V11N2
Figure 1. The Communication Network of the DHNs. Green Edges represent "Replies
to" relation between the accounts. Black Edges represent "Mentions" relation between the
accounts
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Figure 2. The communication network of the DHNs with the identiﬁed FSAs (displayed on
the right). On the left side we zoom-in on the FSAs which are distinguished by diﬀerent
colors)
Figure 3. The Focal Structures obtained form the Social Network of the DHNs
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Figure 4. The Proposed Framework to Study Online Deviant Group Networks
which had the second largest entire graph
count (379) referred to the threat of the
hacktivist group, Anonymous, to attack the
Saudi Government websites 6 as an expres-
sion of their support for a Saudi youth who
was captured at the age of 17 participat-
ing in protest against the Saudi govern-
ment and sentenced to death, and; 3) the
hashtag #OpBeast 7, which had the third
largest entire graph count (213) referring
to the attack that was planned by Anony-
mous, against animal cruelty and deprav-
ity websites. Anonymous were encourag-
ing people to tweet using this hashtag to
spread awareness that they are against some
of the websites that do not operate in the
dark web (some .com websites) which pro-
vide services that show images of animal cru-
elty, feature animal depravity and bestial-
ity. These represented key insights provided
by our methodology, and warrants further
exploratory and observational research into
DHNs.
We then split the collected data into
two (Agent X Agent) networks namely so-
cial network (friends and followers) and
communication network (mentions, and
6#OpNimr: Anonymous ﬁght to stop execution
of Saudi youth. AlJazeera. 2015
7Anonymous launched #OpBeast against animal
cruelty and depravity. TechWorm. 2015
replies) (See Figure 1 ). The communication
network shown in Figure 1 contains 2,740
nodes and 3,445 edges. On the other hand,
the social network contains 56,964 Nodes
and 76,766 edges (not shown here due to its
massive size).
By examining their communication net-
work (Agent X Agent Network of users with
mentions, replies, and tweets), we were able
to identify the accounts they interacted with
the most, the accounts that tweeted the
most, and the accounts that helped spread
their messages by retweeting it. Observing
and monitoring this communication network
of DHNs was key to understanding the con-
tent they were trying to spread e.g., a mes-
sage or propaganda.
We then examined their social network (an
Agent X Agent network of friends/followers
of the hacking groups). This enabled us to
identify the source of information accounts
(accounts who have top out-degree central-
ity), the accounts that receive the infor-
mation (accounts who have top in-degree
centrality), and the accounts that work as
bridges between the diﬀerent parts of the
network (accounts who have top between-
ness centrality). Studying the social net-
work was important to understand the roles
of the nodes in the network (e.g., bridges,
seeders of information, etc.) and the coor-
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dination strategies these groups followed to
spread their message to their audience
3.2.2 FSA Findings
Here, we applied the FSA algorithm on
the communication network and the social
network to ﬁnd the most coordinating set
of nodes instead of single node analysis.
FSA is a recursive modularity-based algo-
rithm. Modularity is a network structural
measure that evaluates cohesiveness of a net-
work (Girvan & Newman, 2002). The FSA
algorithm works in two steps:
Top-down division step: the algorithm
will partition the network into sub-
graphs or sub-structures. This will
obtain the candidate focal structures
from the complex network by applying
the Louvain method of computing mod-
ularity (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte,
& Lefebvre, 2008).
Bottom-up agglomeration step: the
FSA algorithm will stitch the candi-
date focal structures, i.e., the highly
interconnected focal structure or the
focal structures that have the highest
similarity values are stitched together,
then the process iterates until the
highest similarity of all sibling pairs is
less than a given threshold value.
The similarity between two structures is
measured using the well-known Jaccard's co-
eﬃcient (en et al., 2016; Jaccard, 1912)
which results in a value between 0 and 1
(where 1 means the two networks are iden-
tical and 0 means the two networks are not
similar at all). The stitching of the candi-
date focal structures was performed to ex-
tract structures with low densities (en et
al., 2016). We used the development version
of FSA in the UALR Center of Social Media
and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS)
lab8(en et al., 2016).
We ran the FSA algorithm on the com-
munication network (see Figure 2) which
enabled us to identify the set of nodes that
are communicating together at the highest
frequencies. Running FSA here resulted in 8
FSAs (groups) which contain 58 nodes to-
tal (the number of nodes in each FSA is
shown in Table 1, FSA with ID = 1 has
the highest number of nodes i.e., 18 nodes).
Figure 2 shows these focal structures, which
are marked inside the blue circle in the ﬁg-
ure on left. Upon zooming-in on this struc-
ture (displayed on the right) we found the set
of nodes that communicate the most. Each
FSA is distinguished by diﬀerent colors. For
example, the Hacktivist groups (@OpAnon-
Down) and (@CypherLulz) communicate to-
gether a lot more than the rest of the nodes
in the network since they are in the same
focal structure.
We also applied the focal structure algo-
rithm on the social network (the friends
and followers network) (See Figure 3) to ﬁnd
the set of nodes that according to their po-
sition in the network made them the most
coordinating set of nodes instead of a single
node (a focal structure has to act together
to be powerful or eﬀective). This resulted
in 2 FSAs (set of nodes or group of nodes)
which contained 46 total nodes (ﬁgure 3 on
the left is the social network with the the
FSAs, while the right side represents the a
zoomed-in snap showing the 2 FSA nodes).
An example is the hacking group Think Tank
group and the Cult of the dead cow group are
very powerful/eﬀective if they act together
as they are very well connected in the Twit-
ter network (they are in the same focal struc-
ture).
8The FSA version we used is available online at
http://www.merjek.com (guest account - username:
merjek, password: merjek123)
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3.3 Proposed Framework
We propose a framework (See Figure 4)
that can be used to discover the relation-
ship between the deviant groups e.g., hack-
ing groups. The framework starts with seed
knowledge (e.g., accounts or keywords used
by the group) which is usually provided
by domain experts. Second, data collec-
tion with Twitter API (in our case we used
NodeXl). Third, the analysis of the collected
network by examining the overall network,
then the communication network (tweets,
retweets, mentions or replies) then the social
network (the friends and followers network).
Fourth, the application of FSA analysis (en
et al., 2016) to discover coordinating groups.
Finally, the derivation of insights from the
results obtained. A similar approach has
been applied to collect and analyze data
during many online events that were car-
ried out by deviant groups such as ISIL (Al-
khateeb & Agarwal, 2015b), and during the
dissemination of propaganda where the Dra-
goon Ride Exercise conducted (Al-khateeb
& Agarwal, Under review).
4. CONCLUSION &
FUTURE WORK
In this work, we explored one instance of
an online deviant group (i.e., DHNs) net-
work on Twitter. We proposed a frame-
work that can be used to understand DHN's
and their methods of communication as well
as what they are communicating. Such a
framework would enable authorities to act
tactfully and deter and/or reduce the dam-
age done by cyber attacks. To note, this
framework can be reapplied to other forms
of deviant groups utilizing OSNs, such as vi-
olent extremist groups and cybercriminal or-
ganizations.
The authors are aware of the limitation
of this framework as it was applied only to
Twitter, although there are many other so-
cial media outlets. They are also aware of
the limitation of the data collection con-
strained by the Twitter API, as it repre-
sents a small sample of the total popula-
tion of Twitter. For these limitations, we
are planning to study the cross-media aﬃli-
ation of these groups, e.g., the blogs these
DHNs use to disseminate their messages,
and potentially discover hidden links be-
tween those groups through cyber forensic
tools and methodologies. In addition, we
plan to study other social media outlets used
by these groups such as Facebook, Instagram
and Tumblr.
The analysis helped in answering our
stated research questions. More speciﬁcally:
1. Do DHNs use social media platforms to
coordinate attacks? If so, what are their
levels of sophistication?
Discussion: DHNs do use social media to
coordinate attacks and invite their fol-
lowers to participate in them in a very
sophisticated manner as shown in the
two aforementioned cases.
2. Can their aﬃliations be tracked and
monitored?
Discussion: the aﬃliation of DHNs can
be tracked and monitored through the
usage of online social network analysis
tools and techniques. This is part of
what we performed in this study.
3. Can their coordination strategies and
communication networks be inferred
from empirical observation, data set col-
lection, and analysis?
Discussion: we believe by collecting data
sets of diﬀerent events from these groups
we can leverage machine learning to
help in predicting the deviant acts or
their corresponding triggers/causes.
4. Can the most inﬂuential set of nodes be
identiﬁed?
c© 2016 ADFSL Page 17
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Discussion: the most inﬂuential set of
nodes can be identiﬁed as our results
showed using the FSA algorithm.
Additionally, we articulated the need
to bridge the gap between social net-
work analysis and cyber forensic techniques
to uncover hidden relationships between
deviant groups, and obtain forensically-
relevant data. The results showed a strong
connection between those diﬀerent DHNs
through their social network and also a
high volume of communication seemed to
occur between them. This suggests a so-
phisticated ability to coordinate deviant acts
through their social media communication
vectors. By applying FSA we were able
to identify the most inﬂuential set of nodes
in the observed social and communication
networks. By using SNA we were able
to identify the powerful nodes, bridges be-
tween diﬀerent network components, the
hashtags/keywords/bigrams they use, who is
disseminating the most information, etc.
For future work, we plan to analyze the
message contents of these groups, their sen-
timents, and how their followers' sentiments
change over time. By monitoring their sen-
timents and communications, a predictive
model of an attack or organized deviant act
can be developed.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix contains the results we obtained in our project and mentioned in Section 3.2.
Table 2. Top 10 domains and hashtags
Domains Entire Graph Count HashTag Entire Graph Count
twitter.com 536 anonymous 392
ccc.de 389 opnimr 379
anonops.com 177 opbeast 213
bit.ly 111 intelgroup 200
buﬀ.ly 96 opisis 177
youtu.be 81 cccamp15 125
gov.br 80 higsec 118
co.uk 76 alimohammedalnimr 117
pastebin.com 76 oine 94
rt.com 71 radioanonops 90
Table 3. Top 10 keywords and bigrams
Keyword Entire Graph Count Bigram Entire Graph Count
rt 3256 tango,down 173
anonymous 351 rt, anonintelgroup 94
opnimr 381 saudi, arabia 79
down 308 rt, heidi_coon 65
amp 278 down, lulzsecroot 60
now 250 rt, youranonnews 58
isis 234 heidi_coon, opbeast 47
opbeast 211 rt, kaidinn 45
up 209 lt,3 43
intelgroup 209 alimohammedalnimr, opnimr 43
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